

## **THE THREE HISTORICAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE CCP: CONTEXTS AND MEANINGS**

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### **SUMMARY**

The paper presents an in-depth analysis of the “historical resolutions” (历史决议 *lishi jueyi*), documents that have been adopted only three times by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the history of the People’s Republic of China — 1945, 1981 and 2021. This comparative study aims to examine the domestic situation, foreign policy, and the presentation of the leadership position in each resolution using the method of discourse analysis. The paper argues that the documents have a similar structure and leitmotifs, and although their conclusions may sometimes vary, the CCP still states that it utilizes the same methods established in 1945 — to seek truth from facts, be in line with the masses, struggle and independence.

#### KEY FINDINGS

1. All three resolutions discuss the domestic situation in three perspectives — contradictions, mistakes, and guidelines for future development.
2. The party has portrayed itself as the organization that seeks truth from facts, is in line with the masses and for the masses, struggle for a better future and ensure the independence of the country.
3. Similarly, the narratives on international relations mainly consider three dimensions — the international communist movement, global economy transformation and relations with the developing world.
4. Like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping before him, Xi Jinping also won the battle for control of the party against other major political figures of the time. In the case of Xi it was Bo Xilai. After emerging victorious, the three leaders issued historical resolutions that enshrined their positions in the history of the CCP.
5. The 2021 Resolution, as never before, places the paramount leader, Xi Jinping as the one, single leader and shows that there is no true political rival in the party. In contrast, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were placed among the senior leaders from the higher echelon of the CCP.
6. The transformation of China is perceived as a process of transition from a culturally oriented political culture to an institutionally oriented one. In the long term, this goal may well clash with Chinese culture, which has always relied on cultivating interpersonal relations rather than standardization, law, and regulations.
7. Standardization in the domestic arena will be the hallmark for Xi Jinping's future position, and will resonate in China's global standardization policies, especially in the high-tech industry.
8. By mentioning subnational areas: Shenzhen, Pudong and the Hainan Free Trade Zone, the party has highlighted that all three locations play a critical role in acquiring technological resources, financial resources, and the maritime strategy of China.

## INTRODUCTION

2021 marks the centennial anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. In November, the Central Committee issued only the third “Resolution of the Central Committee of the CCP on Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party's Centennial Struggle” in its history. In 1945, as quoted by his personal secretary Hu Qiaomu, Mao Zedong said: “It is not easy for us to include 25 years of history in this historical resolution (...)”. Writing and rewriting history has always been a challenging process. Through drafting the document, the central leadership can check how fast it can proceed with centralization or decentralization of power and check what kind of historical might be included in the resolution in order not to damage consensus within the party. Moreover, the resolutions are aimed at convincing party officials as well as the wider population regarding the future direction for development. Interestingly, the last resolution does not criticize the previous paramount figures but Xi, Mao and Deng are considered glorious because they led the country to achieve “the tremendous transformation from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong”. The paper answers the questions with regard to domestic and international affairs and the position of the paramount leader, and by making a comparative approach shows the similarities and differences between the 1945, 1981 and 2021 resolutions.

## THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: CONTRADICTIONS, MISTAKES, AND GUIDELINES

When analyzing the domestic affairs within the CCP, one can easily identify reoccurring elements – describing contradictions, recalling mistakes, and creating guidelines for the future. Although each document is separated by almost 40 years, the *modus operandi* of each resolution is surprisingly similar despite the political content that at first glance makes them appear to be very different.

The contradictions (maodun 矛盾) lay within the CCP's rhetorical base and play an important part of China's domestic theoretical debates. In the history of the Chinese Communist Party, the discussion started with Mao's paper “On contradiction” (August 1937), and twenty years later, “On the correct handling of contradictions among the people” (February 1957). Verbs that connotated with conflict, such as fight, struggle or stated contradictions are very common and repeated frequently in the three documents.

Each resolution pinpoints a different social tension in order to set itself a new goal, and therefore a justification for specific actions. The 1945 Resolution was heavily focused on the class contradictions that “sparked the modern Chinese revolution”, as well as the conflict between imperialism and feudalism and the Chinese nation, which “constituted a modern society”. The 1981 Resolution found contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie less important. Thus, it introduced a new dilemma for the CCP – the demand of the people for rapid economic and cultural development, and the reality that this policy was falling short of expectations. The 2021 Resolution invokes and summarizes all of the past contradictions, considers them fulfilled, and establishes a new one – unbalanced development and the people’s need for “a better life”. In order to achieve this, the CCP has set its goals of a “people-centric philosophy of development” and common prosperity. In this way, the party not only creates new narratives and alters the political discourse but also presents itself as an institution that takes care of its citizens and their changing needs.

The common prosperity narratives illustrate that in Xi’s China contradictions within the CCP are not welcome. Their results are mistakes, “erroneous” political lines, and each resolution is sure to describe them and warn other party members against straying from the dominating narrative. As in the 1945 Resolution, the contradiction grew from the “Leftist” errors represented by Li Lisan, which was to represent petty-bourgeois thinking. Its four cardinal sins were subjectivism, formalism, dogmatism, and empiricism, which were not defined in great detail. Moreover, the “Left” remained deaf to the righteous remarks of other comrades. These mistakes caused negative political and ideological consequences. In the 1945 Resolution’s perspective, it caused serious losses to the CCP and the Chinese revolution, which the party then tried to correct.

**In this regard, the Party recognizes the need for education of the cadres, in order to become more experienced, open to contact with the masses, and to prevent CCP members from erroneous anti-revolutionary policies that have been the downfall of many “excellent” predecessors.**

The resolution believes the CCP's previous leadership was both disconnected from the masses, and "arrogant, boastful, and afraid of correct criticism and self-criticism". The CCP should be just the opposite – promote democracy within the party, develop open self-criticism, and analyze its mistakes. The members should use Marxism-Leninism methods to carefully study China's politics, military, and economics as guidelines for the action of the Chinese revolution.

The party also corrects its previous mistakes by restoring the good name of the people who have been incorrectly accused of wrongdoing. Moreover, it does not reject people who were "wrong;" even if someone was anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, pro-agrarian revolution – the Left line had dominated for so long, that in the party's opinion these people did not realize their actions were incorrect. Furthermore, any comrade should be welcome without prejudice, if only they understood and corrected their mistakes.

Despite these promises, the 1981 resolution had a great deal of elements to criticize, too. It enumerated mistakes such as "the expansion of class struggle and impatience in economic construction", the "reckless Great Leap Forward", but most importantly, the "Cultural Revolution". In the opinion of the document, it was a result of the wrong assessment of the national situation, and not connected either to Marxism-Leninism, or Chinese reality; a long-term, major mistake that prevented the CCP from achieving great things. The resolution found that these mistakes stemmed from Mao's personality cult that was raised to a "fanatical level", and therefore also caused a lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee. Mao wrongly launched an "anti-rightist" campaign during the Lushan Conference in 1959, which as a consequence, destroyed democracy within the party. The resolution criticizes Hua Guofeng because of the same reasons. Not only did he affirm the "Cultural Revolution" and fail to correct the "historical injustice", but also continued to follow the wrong economic policies. Yet, his cardinal error laid in maintaining the cult of personality. Therefore, he was unable to correct the left-leaning errors in the Party and had to eventually resign from his leadership position.

Nonetheless, the 1981 Resolution tried to soften its harsh comments. It considered Mao a great proletarian revolutionary and explains that his mistakes could be made by anyone in the CCP. This is why, the party had to use self-criticism, oppose "extreme individualism",

and nip any misconceived ideas in the bud. It needed to analyze the opinions of cadres, the masses, and experts. The resolution continued, the CCP cannot hide their mistakes and will try to repair them, because even if it is not ideal, the ability to admit imperfections is what makes them great. It will “uphold the truth and correct mistakes” as a fundamental rule. As one can easily see, this narrative does not differ a great deal from the 1945 Resolution discourse.

The 1981 Resolution found the contradictions to be the source of revisionism in the Party, the same one that led to the Cultural Revolution. The party rectified this mistake, and in so doing, it “resolved numerous contradictions within the party and the people”. The resolution said that Mao was right about contradictions among the people, however, it did not believe they lay within the scope of class struggle. The party, according to the resolution, had to “adopt methods different from class struggle to correctly resolve them, otherwise, it will endanger social stability and unity”. The solution for this issue, the 1981 Resolution suggested, was patriotism. Although the document does not elaborate on this topic, the actions taken by the party in the 1980s corresponded with this conclusion; one of the examples being the sudden creation of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in 1985.

From the perspective of time, one can see that the goals set in the 1981 resolution were foretelling the future. The document stated the need to develop productive forces, improve socialist production, and from then on gradually eliminate class differences. It also suggested that the CCP must rule “in accordance with objective economic and natural laws” and strive to achieve “proportional and coordinated development” of various economic departments.

In many ways, the 2021 Resolution maintains the political traditions of the documents from 1945 and 1981. It upholds the historical narrative of mistakes when it comes to the “erroneous” Left, “Great Leap Forward”, as well as “The Cultural Revolution”. However, it forgets about an important lesson that both warned about – self-criticism and analysis of past mistakes. The 2021 Resolution not only ignores the full political responsibility of Mao but also the tragedy of the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Moreover, it rejects another warning from the 1981 Resolution – of one person cult. The 2021 Resolution takes a

completely different approach in presenting the leader, as described in the third part of this analysis.

The internal challenges that the CCP specifies in 2021 are precisely outlined – money worship, hedonism, ultra-individualism, historical nihilism, inadequate online discourse and “certain leading officials”, who have ambiguous political stances.

**It is the result of a lack of “faith” (xinyang 信仰 ). Using the term reserved for religious beliefs in a political context is an absolute novum. The party will take actions aimed at securing this ideological loyalty among its followers.**

The CCP prides itself in adopting a scientific stance, putting an emphasis on specific research methods and practical reasoning. In fact, the last resolution brings both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping legacies into one basket and takes the most effective approaches from them both. As the leader, Mao brought China out of feudalism and created a revolutionary spirit within the country. For Mao, the three principal methods were: to seek truth from facts, to be in line with the masses, and independence. The 1945 Resolution suggested using Marxism-Leninism methods, but not to follow them blindly: instead, applying them to the Chinese context. It was considered crucial in order not to violate historical and dialectical materialism. Every action the party takes should be for the sake of the masses; China should therefore be independent, but not isolationist.

The 1981 Resolution confirmed these three methods and described them in detail. The same methodology can be found in the 2021 Resolution too. This pragmatic approach was even discussed in the theory section of “The People’s Daily” (17<sup>th</sup> November 2021). It recalled Xi Zhongxun – the father of Xi Jinping. As a leader of the party structure responsible for land reforms in the late 1940s, he called for practical solutions based on the different conditions in the counties. This approach has been assessed as complying with the presented methods, and therefore was praised by Chairman Mao: “I completely agree with the opinions put forward by Comrade Zhongxun. I hope to closely guide the land reform work in the districts and counties based on these opinions so that the land reform work in the border areas will proceed on the right track and make fewer mistakes”. It is worth noting that these elements make clear that the 2021 Resolution

shows great awareness of the roots of the CCP. It refers to close ties with the masses and advocating for their interests without political motivations and follows the same methods as Mao and Deng. The CCP is no longer the party of the one class but presents itself as the party of the whole nation. The party is adamant that “any attempt to divide the CCP from the Chinese people or to set the Chinese people against the CCP is bound to fail”. This statement sounds more like a threat than a promise.

### THE CCP GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES: BETWEEN ISOLATIONISM AND GLOBALIZATION

The CCP has always portrayed itself as a member of the global community, yet different from others, and according to its methods, independent. The 1945 Resolution introduced the CCP as a member of the international community that was truly guided not only by the communist international movement but also, and foremostly, by Chinese policymakers. The triumph of the Soviet revolution stimulated the communists in China to take action and establish the party. The 1945 Resolution mentions the international situation only three times, which illustrates the semi-isolationist tendencies that became increasingly marked after the establishment of the PRC.

In this regard, the 1981 Resolution touches on the history from the perspective of the First Party Congress in Shanghai. It states, the CCP was influenced by the October Revolution and the “May Fourth Movement” and supported by the Marxist-Leninist international organization. However, international engagements were not only seen in a positive light. The Communist International (Comintern) sponsored by the USSR and Soviet communism was considered by Chinese Communists as a “dogmatic and sacrificed ideology”. These wrongdoings were corrected by Mao Zedong Thought and provided the basis for the original version of revolution supported by poor peasants, later named as Socialism with Chinese characteristics. As argued by the 1981 Resolution, the ideology should not be implemented by external forces but should be adjusted to national conditions, practices of its own revolutionary path and allows for the implementation of universal values of Marxism-Leninism. Regarding this point, Mao is portrayed as the leader who corrected external wrongdoings and led China to the next step of its revolutionary development according to its own context, instead of blindly following theory



The abovementioned reasoning, however, does not lead the CCP to remain exclusively domestically oriented. In its international policy the Chinese government called for the peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual assistance supported by the independence and respect for the independent rights of the people of other countries. Allowing freedom to take its own path only within Marxism-Leninism was seen as true internationalism, and without which communism could only turn into hegemonism.

The 1981 Resolution elaborates further on the Chinese merits in the international area. The communist revolution had a deep, everlasting influence (有深刻的久远的影响 *you shenke de jiu yuan de yingxiang*) on successful resistance against fascism during the Second World War. The international situation in the late 1940s was to create favorable international conditions for the PRC's "socialist construction" and promote the beneficial development of humankind. After the establishment of the PRC, the government supported the global communist movement in its fight against imperialism, colonialism, semi-colonialism, racism, while also advocating for world peace by playing "an increasingly more important and active role" (越来越重大的积极作用 *yuelai yue zhongda de jiji zuoyong*) in the international community of oppressed people.

One might say that the "Cultural Revolution" with the export of revolutionary thoughts worldwide was the perfect example of the CCP's mission. This thinking, however, was challenged by the 1981 Resolution. The largest portion of the document discussed the "Cultural Revolution" in detail and presented "the lost decade" as an obstacle for China's engagement with the world. This mistake was set to be rectified after the Fourth Plenum in 1973 when Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping regained power over the State Council. Once the technocrats won the domestic competition, the understanding of the global arena took on a more positive approach, and the government positioned itself to use these favorable conditions to open up the country.

The 2021 Resolution recognized respect as the critical goal for China in the international community. With the focus on "national humiliation" in domestic discourse, it is no surprise that the document reiterates this as a crucial element for further Chinese development. After years of humiliation was brought to an end by the victory of the communist revolution, the Chinese party and the people struggled to be recognized as

the representation of China. Along with having a seat in the United Nations, the international community acknowledged the “one China” policy while China with its “three worlds” theory made a solemn promise not to seek hegemony.

**By encouraging the international community to both recognize the PRC, and not Taiwan, as the legal government of China and praising the China model, China has won respect and praise (zunzhong he zanyu 尊重和赞誉), especially from developing countries.**

In the new era (understood as the Xi era beginning in 2012), in all aspects of political life, including diplomacy and international strategy, the CCP has made a significant step (feiyue 飞跃) in the Sinicization of Marxism. According to the document, the party resolutely managed to change international and domestic politics and adjust the way of development to the prevailing national conditions. This approach is portrayed as the policy in reforming and opening up China with Shenzhen, Pudong, and other port cities, as well as inland big cities in order to utilize the “two markets and two resources” strategy, namely both external and domestic markets and the financial and technological resources. Within the top-down design, the CCP proposed the dual circulations economy. A dual circulations economy, as described by the party in earlier documents, is based on external and domestic markets; it is also part of national security. The party in this new era, as said in the resolution, needs to achieve full control over the army, the people’s army that by winning the battles can demonstrate its superiority over the West’s military might.

In this context, as portrayed by the resolution, the global economic structure is experiencing a structural and institutional contradiction, which is illustrated by unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development. In this regard, the Belt and Road Initiative is considered a public good and a facilitator of international cooperation. As a remedy to what it sees as inefficient global economic development, the CCP advocates the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, building a global network of high-standard free trade zones, a pilot free trade zone, a Hainan Free Trade Port, the promotion of the institutional opening of rules, regulations, management, and standards, and to form a larger and more comprehensive opening-up approach.

As during the Cold War, China's international politics is full of contradictions that the party needs to define. As discussed in the resolution, the BRI is seen as the remedy for an unbalanced global economy and as a countermeasure to anti-globalization forces, namely: unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism, and power politics. The world has entered a period of turbulent changes and the Party's Central Committee needs to adjust its international strategy and mitigate unprecedented external risks and challenges. This can only be realized by the alignment of domestic and international situations, improving the party's foreign affairs leadership system and mechanism, strengthening the top echelons of foreign affairs (*dingceng sheji* 顶层设计), and make strategic plans for major diplomacy which has Chinese characteristics. This understanding of top-down design's influence on China's foreign policy puts the Central Leading Small Group on Foreign Policy and International Department of the CCP at the heart of China's foreign policy decision-making process. The party is portrayed as the leading force in China's foreign policy that: Even in the middle of chaos – as the current global situation is described – China's diplomacy is more influential, charismatic, and effective. This reasoning leads to the fact that the party needs to maintain regular contacts with more than 500 political parties and political organizations around the world to deepen party exchanges and cooperation. Going further, this is reflected in the growing role of the party in protecting overseas interests and managing global risks and challenges. As the majority of countries use governmental channels to conduct international relations, the "party-in-command" diplomacy might create room for semi-isolationism. However, China declares it wants to actively participate in the reform and construction of the global governance system with the United Nations at its core. In the context of global and regional diplomacy, the resolution places China's diplomacy as the leading force in finding political solutions to global and regional issues. Interestingly, the pandemic is seen as a positive catalyst that allows China to demonstrate its image of being a responsible member of the international community and the provider of material assistance, medical support, vaccine assistance especially in developing countries.

Apart from international activities by party-led diplomacy, the resolution presents the military as a vital component of China. The army has previously been seen as an

important part of China's international outreach. As said in the resolution, the PRC can effectively respond to external military provocations, deter Taiwan independence, conduct border defense, maritime rights protection, counterterrorism and maintain stability, conduct emergency rescue and disaster relief missions, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, ,conduct military diplomacy and combatting the pandemic.

As argued by China expert Jude Blanchette (2021), the phrase “祖国完全统一的时和势始终在我们这一边” (*zuguo wanquan tongyi de shi he shi shizhong zai women zhe yibian*) might always be interpreted as a message that when it comes to the Taiwan issue, the CCP always has time, and is in no hurry.

However, this approach contradicts the statement that the party needs to solve unresolved problems. In the domestic-international arena, the party declared that under its new leader, Xi Jinping, both the party and China need to “overcome a series of major risks and challenges, solving many long-term problems that have not been solved, and accomplishing many major things that were wanted but not done in the past, and pushing the cause of the party and the country to make historic achievements”. However, this contradicts the previous statement that the CCP “always has time” to discuss the Taiwan issue. In other words, it shows that the question of reunification with the motherland is still a questionable issue.

### THE BIG THREE: PARAMOUNT LEADERSHIP POSITION

In the 1945 Resolution, Mao is portrayed as an exceptional leader of the CCP and the creator of Maoism. The resolution details his role in building the "correct political line" and eliminating "hostile thinking patterns" within the party. It was through him that the party first "reached its current level of consolidation and unity" ideologically, politically, organizationally, and militarily, making it an "unbeatable force". In expounding the CCP's strategy, the reference to Mao was proof of the validity of all of the theses. One must also note the presentation of the chairman as the "providential husband" at the Zunyi Conference. Mao's seizure of power signaled a new era in the CCP's history. He was placed right next to Stalin, whom he was supposed to imitate in his management of the state, for example with regard to land reform.

Out of the three leaders, Deng Xiaoping was the least mentioned in the 1981 resolution. In line with historical realities, Deng was placed on an equal footing with Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun and Liu Shaoqi, who was then described as "China's Khrushchev No. 1", while Deng Xiaoping was assigned number two. Deng's position was also discussed in relation to the death of Zhou Enlai, after whom he was to take over and "under Mao's guidance lead the state." This was followed by the context of "riots after Zhou Enlai's death". The suppression of protests in the spring of 1975 was described by the resolution as a "mistake" that led to Deng's removal from power. After the arrest of the "Gang of Four," As Deng Xiaoping faced internal opposition who were against reforms, the resolution strengthened his position. The resolution mentions only once that Deng was "a candidate for principal leader in the State Council," but this is also in reference to the situation during the "Cultural Revolution" when he became deputy prime minister in October 1974. Although Deng was only presented in a historical light, this was undoubtedly an important bargaining chip in the power struggle with Hua Guofeng, who was seen as representing a continuation of Mao Zedong's ideology. Deng won, although as a victim of the "Cultural Revolution" and a politician anointed by Zhou Enlai, with no mention of his actual position in the CCP at the time, he was initially seen as having less of a chance of victory.

Compared to Deng and the 1981 Resolution, Xi Jinping is mentioned far more often in the 2021 Resolution, even approaching Mao and the 1945 Resolution in this regard. However, the resolution has less historical context than the previous two, with the remainder of the resolution acting as a discussion of the current president's merits. Like Mao, Xi is presented as an outstanding leader. His guiding party role is emphasized repeatedly, as is his thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics, described as "the Marxism of modern China and the twenty-first century." The document for the first time acknowledges its authorship by the CCP with Xi at its head - until now it was a joint product of the Party and the people. The similarities to Mao do not end there - the resolution creates a cult of Xi in a manner similar to the 1945 document. It is no coincidence that the beginning of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics (also referred to as a historic turning point) was marked at the 18th Session of the National People's Congress, when Xi assumed the position of CCP General Secretary. The current

PRC chairman is expected to stand alone behind a number of the resolution's proposals and strategies on national revival, security, ideology, and the Taiwan issue, among others, as a result of his "meticulous evaluation and deep reflection." The resolution also repeatedly reiterates the need to maintain Xi's leadership of the Party to achieve these goals; moreover, it warns against a lack of effort in achieving these set tasks. In order not to disrupt the work, one must conform ideologically and politically, which has unfortunately been a problem in the past, as many CCP members have undergone a "crisis of political conviction."

**Importantly, the phrase 信仰 (xinyang) is used here, which also occurs in a religious context, by which the phrase can be translated as "crisis of political belief." The use of "faith" is an absolute novelty in the three resolutions.**

In the 1945 resolution it appeared only once in the context of "faith in the people's revolution", while "faith" again appeared only once in 1981's resolution but in a negative sense, as if Deng Xiaoping's "four principles" did not need to be challenged. The 2021 resolution marks a substantial change, as faith in the current leader appears repeatedly. Party members are expected to be "strong believers and loyal practitioners" of Xi Jinping's thoughts on "socialism with Chinese characteristics of the new era."

This "faith" approach goes together with "zi wo geming" (自我革命) and partly refers to the self-cultivation taken from the Chinese civilization, only mentioned in the last resolution, which urged the party members to "cultivate self-revolutionary spirit". Interestingly, the 2021 Resolution is the only one of the three that discusses Chinese civilization but of course it is placed alongside Chinese socialism and the leaders' contribution to Marxism-Leninism. Followed by bringing faith inside the party, the resolution presents the solutions with "two establishments" (liangge queli 两个确立): *The party established Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party Central Committee and the core position of the entire party and established Xi Jinping's guiding position in the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics.* This approach should remind of the two whatevers (liangge fanshi 两个凡是) campaign, promoted by Hua Guofeng, which tried to follow Mao Zedong's line without any adjustments and flexibility.

## CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, the importance of the historic resolutions is derived from the fact that they mark the end of huge political campaigns and signal that the leader is strong enough to pursue their vision of the country. In the current context, the resolution also symbolizes that through changing the narrative in favor of “common prosperity” and “benefit for the people”, the Chinese Communist Party legitimizes its position in China. All three resolutions touch on the domestic affairs throughout by discussing contradictions, and similar approaches are taken to describe the international situation. Throughout the new resolution, Xi Jinping promotes his place in China’s history as an innovator and a pioneer of political transformation goals. Following the revolutionary approach of Mao Zedong and the entrepreneurial approach of Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping’s institutional approach promotes the National People’s Congress as the institutional model of China’s consultative democracy through standardization by all means possible. Xi Jinping’s model of socialism with a Chinese characteristic in the new era will be supported by digital technologies and will be seen as “taking up the torch” from Mao and Deng and ensuring the continuity of China’s development.

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