In its statement, Indonesia referred to the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding a territorial dispute in the SCS between the People's Republic of China and the Philippines. The tribunal's ruling challenged China’s territorial claims in that area, expressed in the form of the Nine-Dash Line map; it was also found that no feature within the Spratly Islands archipelago meets the conditions for determining an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf.
The main legal interpretation, in this case, was the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To date, no country in the region has expressed strong support for the 2016 judgment, which settled the dispute in favour of the Philippines.
Due to Beijing's denial of the verdict, the tribunal's decision alone did not change the situation in the SCS. In addition, the final resolution of the dispute coincided with the Philippines 2016 presidential election [subsequently won by Rodrigo Duterte] where he sought a new approach toward China, bypassing international law issues.
It is possible that Indonesia’s note will initiate a series of processes leading to the so-called “snowball effect”. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is highly asymmetric in almost every aspect; its decision-making processes (largely based on the need for unanimity) clearly impede the functioning of the organisation.
Jakarta’s decision to reference the 2016 determination may seem surprising, all the more so since Indonesia is not an official claimant in the territorial dispute in the SCS. Nevertheless, Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships are now trespassing more and more into their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Regency, an archipelago located on the edge of the area delineated by the so-called "Nine-Dash Line". Tensions between the two sides first began to develop (due to this issue) in 2016. However, the last incident in December 2019 was met with a definite response from President Joko Widodo who sent air and naval forces to the area.
Everything indicates that the verbal note to António Guterres is not only a manifestation of support for the parties to the territorial dispute, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan but, above all, it is also a signal to Beijing that Indonesia has a wide range of tools it is willing to use if China continues its provocative actions that strike at the sovereignty of the state.
It is possible that Indonesia’s note will initiate a series of processes leading to the so-called “snowball effect”. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is highly asymmetric in almost every aspect; its decision-making processes (largely based on the need for unanimity) clearly impede the functioning of the organisation. China is well aware of this, as can be seen in the way Beijing conducts its foreign policy in the region. It is mainly based on building strong bilateral relations with each of the member states separately. Thanks to strong economic and political connections with countries such as Laos or Cambodia, China can destabilise ASEAN from within.
According to the results of a recent survey published by CSIS, Vietnam can be seen as most aware of ASEAN’s helplessness. Respondents from that country were the only ones (the survey also involved representatives of countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore) not to indicate ASEAN as the institution or initiative most important to the regional order. The largest number of respondents were in favour of the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia quadrilateral cooperation). In turn, ASEAN was in second place, although the same number of votes was also received by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, introduced in refreshed form by Donald Trump in November 2017 during his visit nowhere else but in Vietnam. The attitude of the government in Hanoi is all the more important as this year has seen Vietnam take the role of ASEAN Chair and, according to unofficial reports, the presidency may be extended for another year due to obstacles in implementing initiatives resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
A clear warming of Hanoi-Washington relations has been seen since 2018 when the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier entered the port of Danang for the first time since the Vietnam War. Everything indicates that Vietnam will strive to strengthen its relations with individual members of the Quad as well as the ties between ASEAN and the Quad itself. Hanoi's strategy for Beijing's increasingly assertive foreign policy may assume the largest possible internationalisation of the dispute in the SCS through direct involvement of the Quad. Considering China's trade wars with the US and Australia, and recent border skirmishes with India, further Quad consolidation may occur, even though Donald Trump has not paid much attention to strengthening American alliances so far, especially when it comes to multilateral formats.
In addition to the growing assertiveness of China's global foreign policy, attention should also be drawn to the continued expansion and militarisation of artificial islands, the introduction of the fishing ban covering the EEZs of other countries, the installation of the “Blue Ocean Information Network” developed by state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), and the designation of the Anti Area Access Denial (A2/AD) in the SCS air space. It is all happening despite the declarations of peaceful settlement of the dispute and the ongoing negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct together with ASEAN (though it seems that negotiations remain deadlocked). Indonesia's resolute actions towards Beijing may, therefore, contribute to similar steps being taken by other countries.
In the case of Vietnam, there have been unofficial reports for some time saying Hanoi’s decision-makers are increasingly considering filing a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice, as the Philippines did in 2013. Obtaining support from other countries in the region for the 2016 ruling would not only increase pressure on China, but it would most likely encourage other parties to the dispute to pursue a legal path in order to secure their territorial claims. Therefore, the role of India, which has embraced the position of a swinging state in the relations between China and the United States, wanting to remain neutral, is not insignificant. In the eyes of many countries in the region, only India is able to offset China's growing influence, which is why so much emphasis was placed, in the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), on persuading India to take part in that initiative, unfortunately, this failed.
In summary, Jakarta's decisive response to the violation of Indonesia's EEZ by Chinese ships at the end of 2019, as well as its support for the 2016 tribunal ruling that undermined Chinese claims in the South China Sea may seem unimportant; however, the situation in the region should be considered from a much wider perspective. In needing to maintain its internal stability in the era of the economic slowdown resulting from COVID-19 pandemic, China must fuel nationalist sentiment, which, in turn, is associated with the implementation of a risky international policy, which may lead to growing resentment from other countries. That, in turn, may accelerate the consolidation process under the Quad, which, with the support of countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, will be putting up more and more resistance against the activities of the Chinese fleet in the SCS.
This article was originally published by the 9DashLine and can be found here.