At ASEAN, the prime ministers of Vietnam and Malaysia, as well as the President of the Philippines, called for compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While some commentators have drawn attention to the stronger message in the organisation’s final statement, which invoked UNCLOS, I however, am inclined to agree with the view of Collin Koh of Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He stressed in early July that ASEAN must drastically change its approach concerning the situation in the South China Sea. The current strategy towards Chinese activity he argues in a recent piece does not bring any measurable effect in altering Beijing’s behaviour.
The main reason for ASEAN's failure to manage the dispute with China, Koh considers, is the widening division within the association which prevents it from building a united position against Beijing’s conduct. In this context, it is worth noting that within ASEAN there are also fierce bilateral disputes over spheres of influence in the South China Sea. Indonesia and Vietnam have previously clashed with one another. Likewise, there have been repeated incidents over illegal fishing between Vietnam and Malaysia.
ASEAN's ineffectiveness in managing the South China Sea dispute was best demonstrated by events immediately after the summit. Following the videoconference, on 1 July the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in Hainan Province announced naval manoeuvres near the Paracel Islands (the features disputed between the PRC, Vietnam, and Taiwan). In addition to military units, the exercises also included coast guard ships and maritime militia under the command of the Central Military Commission of China, which was possible due to the recent legal changes approved by the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee.
The day after the exercises began, both the Philippines and Vietnam raised their opposition. Delfin Lorenzana, the Philippines Minister of Defense, described the PRC's manoeuvres near the disputed shoals as "highly provocative". Although Manila does not have any claims to the Paracel archipelago, its explicit disapproval of military exercises outside China’s territorial waters is intended to prevent similar Chinese actions near the Spratly Islands in the future. In turn, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly accused Beijing of violating their sovereignty, owing to it its presence and claims in the Paracels. Tellingly, it warned that the exercises were having a negative effect on wider Sino-ASEAN relations.
Rising tensions between great powers
The United States also joined the criticism of the Chinese naval manoeuvres. On 2 July, the Department of Defense issued a statement which expressed concern that the exercises in the disputed area of the South China Sea would waste all efforts to reduce tensions and strengthen the stability of the region. Beijing is also accused of violating obligations contained in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
First, on the point about refraining from actions that could lead to complications or escalation of the dispute. Shortly after a statement from the US Department of Defense, two aircraft carriers, the USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan and four other fleet units were sent to the South China Sea to conduct exercises aimed at:
"sending the signal to allies in this area that the United States is ready to protect the security and stability of the region."
In their official statements, the commanders of the carriers denied that their presence in the South China Sea was a direct response to recent Chinese exercises. In Beijing however, the deployment was clearly received in that fashion. In an official statement, Ren Guoqiang, China’s Ministry of Defense spokesman, challenged the US Department of Defence's allegations of escalating tensions in the region. He emphasised that the exercises near the Spratly Islands are part of annual military manoeuvres aimed at increasing the navy's defence capabilities, safeguarding national sovereignty and security, and maintaining peace and stability in the region.
In turn, American activity in the region was criticised. Chinese officials rebuked the deployment, adding that the US Navy was militarising the region and would ultimately lead to deteriorating relations between China and neighbouring countries.
Although analysts on both sides assess the risk of a conventional conflict in the South China Sea as low, the increased military activity by Beijing and Washington, combined with the proximity of their forces to one another risks an incident. Amid rising tensions and deteriorating diplomatic ties, such an incident could easily lead to a rapid escalation. This scenario is extremely dangerous for the countries of Southeast Asia, who would inevitably be forced to take sides. Something they want to avoid at all costs due to respective economic and military dependencies.
Therefore, resolving the territorial dispute as quickly as possible by consulting and reaching a consensus, is clearly in ASEAN's interest. While the process of negotiating the Code of Conduct is ongoing, it should be noted that no direct meeting has taken place since the beginning of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Other options for resolving the dispute, such as filing a claim with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, do not guarantee a settlement.
12 July saw the fourth anniversary of the tribunal's ruling on a territorial dispute filed in 2013 against China by the administration of then Filipino President, Benigno Aquino III. Despite the favourable result for the Philippines, the situation in the South China Sea remained unchanged as China refuses to comply with the court's decision. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs used the anniversary to summon Beijing in a special statement to comply with the judgment issued under UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the Chinese embassy in Manila once again reiterated Beijing's official position on the matter, according to which the ruling is illegal and therefore invalid.
Conclusion
Tensions between Beijing and Washington look set to grow, due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and the impending presidential election. China will remain one of the main issues until the end of the campaign, which heralds an even greater sharpening of rhetoric by both Republicans and Democrats. This view was reinforced, via the recent statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo which referenced the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling and rejected Chinese territorial claims expressed through the nine-dash line.
Therefore, everything indicates that Southeast Asia will not only have to deal with the pandemic's aftermath but will also be forced to watch how a great power rivalry plays out in their front yard. This is not good news for ASEAN, as according to an old African proverb “when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers".
This article was originally published by the 9DashLine and can be found here.